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THE APPLICABILITY OF TORGERSON'S CONCEPT OF FIAT MEASUREMENT 
IN DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Christine V. Zavgren and S. J. Lambert 
Department of Accounting 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
The concept of "fiat measurement" is an alternative to funda-
mental and derived measurement. This concept is believed to be more 
descriptive of measurement in the social sciences, where in most cases 
theories as well-formed as those in the physical sciences do not exist. 
In fiat measurement an index or measurement of a concept is assumed 
to be representative of that concept. However, the representation be-
tween a measurement scale and the theoretical concept cannot be 
proven. Although fiat measurement is descriptive of much current work 
in social sciences, it is shown to be a problematic concept because of 
its arbitrariness, lack of foundation in theory, and non-confirmability. 
The nature of theories and the relations of measurement to scientific 
theories are discussed. The use of fiat measurement is related to a pre-
scientific state of some of the social sciences. Before better forms of 
measurement can be used, considerable theoretical development is 
necessary in these sciences. 
t t t 
MEASUREMENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of 
fiat measurement and to characterize its place in scientific 
theories of developmental-stage disciplines. Two major mea-
surement-classification systems will be briefly surveyed to 
determine where fiat measurement fits. This is followed by 
consideration of the general structure of theories in order to 
characterize fiat measurement more formally. Finally, several 
examples are given. 
Two primary classification systems have been developed 
to describe measurement. First, Campbell (1928) recognized 
two kinds of measurement: fundamental and derived. His 
system is descriptive of kinds of measurement used in the 
physical sciences, but it has often been extended to the social 
sciences. Campbell's system is based on whether or not a par-
ticular measure depends on any prior measurement. 
Fundamental measurement depends on no prior measure-
ment. Practically, only a few properties, such as length, time, 
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value, numerosity, and mass are fundamentally measurable. 
Derived measurement depends on the prior measurement of 
fundamental magnitudes and is descriptive of measures such 
as density and acceleration. 
Campbell's classification system of measurement fits well 
in the more mature sciences. Whereas physical sciences such as 
physics and chemistry are well developed and have explicit 
structures, many of the social sciences do not. When Camp-
bell's structure is extended in an attempt to describe social 
science measurement, problems arise with the disciplines 
which are in earlier stages of development, or which are "pre-
scientific." In the social sciences there are few examples of 
fundamental or derived measurement. One objective of this 
paper is to discuss this paucity and to link it to the status of 
the development of social science theories. 
A second major measurement-classification system was 
developed by Stevens (1959: 18-36), a social scientist. Stevens' 
system is based on the types of measurement scales which are 
used. He identified five scale types: nominal, ordinal, interval, 
ratio, and logarithmic interval scales. The basis of his system 
is the type of transformation that leaves the scale form invari-
ant. It is Stevens' system which is usually used when social 
science measurement is discussed. 
While Stevens' system is descriptive of the classifica-
tion of scalings used in the social sciences, it does not shed 
light on issues such as the meaning of measurement scales 
in relation to abstract theoretical concepts. Although Stevens' 
system will classify measurement scales according to their 
mathematical properties, it does not deal with the question 
of whether or not they are artificial constructs. That is, it 
will define an intelligence scale as being an interval scale, 
but not whether an intelligence test actually measures intelli-
gence. Thus, a second objective is to analyze the theoretical 
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importance of measurement scales and the properties which 
they measure. 
Suggestions have been made by several authors for ex-
panding these measurement-classification systems, notably 
Coombs (1952), Ellis (1966), and Torgerson (1958). Their aim 
has been to establish the characteristics which are necessary 
to classify a scaling technique or numerical-assignment tech-
nique as measurement. With this in mind, Torgerson (1958: 
21-24) added to Campbell's system a third kind of measure-
ment, which he called fiat measurement. In fiat measurement, 
the associative relation between the property to be measured 
and one or more observable properties which serve as indices 
of it is somewhat arbitrarily defined. The measurement of the 
observable property is considered an index of the underlying 
non-observable property. This is similar to Ellis' (1966:56) 
concept of associative measurement, which he considered only 
to be possible' if "there is an independently measurable quan-
tity, q, associated with the quantity, p, to be measured, such 
that if things (under certain specified conditions) are arranged 
in the order of q, they are also arranged in the order of p." 
The arbitrary nature of the measurement emerges because, if 
the underlying concept is non-measurable, then the establish-
ment of the correspondence between the ordering of the two 
properties is not factually demonstrable. This type of measure-
ment is represented by measures of intelligence, hunger, and 
social status. Although far from ideal, these types of measure-
ments continue to find use in the social sciences because the 
underlying non-measurable properties have utility, and because 
none of the more preferable measures is yet possible. 
GENERAL STRUCTURE 
OF THEORIES AND MEASUREMENT 
An understanding of the essential place of measurement 
for the confirmation and predictive ability of theories holds 
promise of adding insight to problems of measurement in the 
social sciences. To this end, it is necessary to discuss the struc-
ture of scientific theories, and then to ascertain the nature of 
measurement in relation to theories. 
A scientist examines a particular aspect of the world, or 
domain, with generally three objectives: to discover general 
regularities which explain the phenomena which he observes 
(general laws), to make predictions, and to control or influ-
ence the relevant domain in the environment. The objectives 
must proceed in order. To discover general regularities, the 
scientist abstracts the most important elements of the domain, 
or selected portion of the environment. These basic elements 
are the theoretical terms, which through induction are stated 
in axioms of the system. The axioms state the important rela-
tions between these elements. In the axiomatic-deductive 
method, these basic elements and relationships form a mathe-
matical or formal model, which is intended to be descriptive 
of the domain. Mathematical or logical calculi are then applied' 
to this basic model to deduce as complete a description of the 
structure of the domain as is necessary and practicable. 
This basic model is used, through deductive reasoning, to 
derive testable hypotheses, predictions, and normative state-
ments (especially in the case of the social sciences). A well-
formed theory must be logically consistent, its logical struc-
ture should not be redundant, and it should be complete in 
the sense that it must be possible to derive a statement de-
scribing all essential characteristics of the subject matter. A 
theory is not complete if it cannot provide sufficient predic-
tions and explanations. As well as satisfying these three formal 
criteria, a theory must be factual, or confirmable. Hypotheses 
generated from the model should be testable, and these tests 
must indicate that they are not contrary to fact. To these 
traditional criteria of scientific theories, it is well to add a fifth 
which is of importance especially in the social sciences: the 
criterion of social usefulness. A social theory must be evalu-
ated in terms of its usefulness in establishing policy or making 
decisions. 
Theories which contain testable hypotheses are said to 
have empirical content. Empirical content is added to a theory 
by interpreting the formal structure in order to ascertain if 
the structure yields realistic propositions. Any formal struc-
ture which purports to describe the domain is a model, but a 
model only becomes a theory when empirical confirmation is 
added. 
Figure 1 illustrates, in a simplified sense, the relationship 
between axiomatic theory and the domain of the real world 
to which the theory applies. 
The mathematical conclusions are hypotheses which, 
when interpreted, must not contradict observations in the 
real world; these are actually predictions concerning objects 
Observational Theoretical 
Language Language 
Real World ____ --.C> Abstraction---> Mathematical I Syr 
Experiment Mathematical I l um,n, 
Physical Mathematical 
Conclusions <---- Interpretation <-- Conclusions 
FIGURE 1. Scientific investigation (adapted from Coombs, 
Raiffa, and Thrall, 1954:133). 
and properties in the domain. A test of such a hypothesis 
amounts to matching the mathematical conclusions against 
physical events. If correspondence is found, the theory is said 
to be confirmed. If none is found, the theory is not con-
firmed, and it is merely a formal structure without interpreta-
tion. Such a structure is useless in any discipline which needs 
useful predictions and general rules to apply to empirical 
situations. 
Measurement theory relates to theory construction in 
that measurement is the strongest form of correspondence. 
Whereas in the tests of hypotheses with which we have been 
concerned correspondence between the real world and the 
structure of the theory was needed, in measurement the cor-
respondence is an exact numerical one. Instead of the corres-
pondence between theory and domain being qualitative, the 
correspondence mirrors the ordering of events in the real 
world in a very strictly determined way. 
FIAT MEASUREMENT 
Classification of a measurement as fiat measurement 
rather than as some higher form of measurement seems attrib-
utable to two potential problems within a theory which is not 
well-developed: 
1. The nature of the relationships among the theory's 
theoretical terms may not be well-established, or 
2. The nature of the relationship between the theory's 
theoretical and observational terms may not be well-
established. 
Several possible combinations of these relationships are 
shown in Figure 2. The solid arrow indicates a relationship 
that is well-established, and the wavy arrow indicates a fuzzy 
onc. Terms which have been used to describe these are consti-
tutive significance and epistemic significance (Dumont and 
Wilson, 1970). 
Constitutive significance refers to the nature of the rela-
tionships among the theoretical terms or Theoretical Vocabu-
lary, VT, of a theory and relates primarily to its explanatory 
power. This relationship can be relatively strong or weak. 
When strong, the theory's explanatory power is strong, with 
some of the assumptions of the theory having achieved the 
status of scientific laws. When relatively weak, the explanatory 
power of the theory is weak. 
Epistemic significance refers to the nature of the relation-
ship between observable terms or Observational Vocabulary, 
VO, and theoretical terms, VT, of a theory and relates pri-
marily to its predictive power. This relationship can be well-
established (when representation is proved) or fuzzy, when it 
is arbitrarily assigned. 
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As Figure 2 shows, a theory in a mature science has both 
epistemic and constitutive significance. The logical relations 
between the theoretical terms are well-established, and the 
correspondence rules between theoretical and observational 
terms are empirically justified. The mapping representation in 
the measurement function has been empirically verified . In those 
theories classified as less well-developed, either constitutive or 
epistemic significance is absent, or in some cases both are not 
well-established. In a pre-scientific discipline, the epistemic sig-
nificance may be vaguely conceived. That is, the relations 
between theoretical terms or between theoretical and observa-
tional terms may be approximately known, but not exactly 
well-defined. If constitutive significance is absent, the contribu-
tion of theoretical terms to explanation and prediction is not 
empirically verified. Progression from a pre-scientific discipline 
to a mature science involves improving the status of terms and 
relations through logical analysis and empirical verification. 
Several hypothetical examples of social science measure-
ment are also shown in Figure 2. The measurement of depre-
ciation is a case in which a given income concept (such as 
economic income) leads to a well-defined depreciation concept 
(such as economic depreciation). However, economic depre-
ciation is not in many cases an operational concept. Thus, 
although the relation between the theoretical terms and the 
properties to be measured is well-defined, the mapping repre-
sentation cannot be established exactly. 
In measuring intelligence, problem-solving ability and 
vocabulary, as well as other properties, might be assumed to 
be related to intelligence, but this cannot be proven. However, 
the mapping function between problem-solving ability and the 
intelligence test is verified. In this case the relationship be-
tween the theoretical term and the property to be measured 
is not well-established, whereas the mapping representation is 
well-established. 
In the pre-scientific measurement of social status shown in 
Figure 2, it can be seen that both types of relationships are 
weak. Social status is assumed to be somewhat related to up-
ward mobility, which in turn, is assumed to be related to 
salary. However, these relationships cannot be substantiated 
beyond statistical tests of significance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Social science theories which employ fiat measurement 
are useful since they provide a more formal way of looking at 
phenomena: they provide at least a starting point for develop-
ing a science. Fiat measurements certainly are not as desirable 
as fundamental and derived ones because of the lack of veri fica-
tion of relationships between indices and theoretical concepts. 
Fiat measurement leads to the danger of scientific relativism, 
because factual truth cannot be verified. 
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FIGURE 2. Measurement and the development of sciences. (VT = Theoretical Vocabulary; V 0 = Observational Vocabulary.) 
Fiat measurement is, however, descriptive of measurement 
as it is performed in many of the social sciences. Fiat measure-
ments do provide refinement of knowledge which can lead to a 
clarification of epistemic and constitutive significance. When 
this clarification proceeds to the point that the science has 
both epistemic and constitutive significance, the discipline has 
evolved into a mature science. Then measurement in the classi-
cal sense is possible. 
John Dewey (I938:345) quoted Charles Peirce's expres-
sion of a similar idea: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract 
statement with the ideal limit towards which endless inquiry 
would tend to bring scientific belief." 
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